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, 
CHAPTER 12 
Zoning and Land Use 
CHARLES M. HAAR and BARBARA HERING 
§12.1. Introduction. Land use regulation has claimed attention 
from both legislature and courts during the 1961 SURVEY year. Both 
have addressed themselves to small aspects of large problems rather 
than attempting a thoroughgoing overhaul of any branch of land use 
law. By and large, however, their activity has been in different areas 
of the subject. The legislature has been concerned primarily with the 
substantive law, with conferring and limiting rights and powers. 
The courts have been more occupied with questions of procedure and 
remedy. 
A. LEGISLATION 
§12.2. Subdivision controls. The subdivision law, which has been 
the subject of much comment and considerable criticism, was amended 
several times. The most important of these relates to Section 5A of 
Chapter 40A of the General Laws.1 This section deals ,with the 
protection afforded by plat approval against changes in the existing 
zoning law. Under both the old law and the present amendment, 
the owner of a lot made substandard by an upgrading of area or 
frontage requirements can build on it only if he satisfies three condi-
tions: the lot must have been laid out on a duly recorded plan; it must 
have been standard at the time of recordation; and it must have a 
minimum area of 5000 square feet and frontage of fifty feet. The old 
law also provided that at the time of the upgrading the adjoining lots 
must have been in different ownership. The amendment retains this 
requirement, but in the alternative; under it, if the owner acts within 
five years from the date of recording of his original plan that has been 
rendered nonconforming, he may build on the substandard lot not-
withstanding his having owned and perhaps still owning the adjoining 
lot. The amendment also spells out the section's applicability to 
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§12.2. 1 Acts of 1961, c. 435. Chapter 40A, although the Zoning Enabling Act, 
contains several provisions relating directly or indirectly to subdivision control. See, 
e.g., G.L., c. 40A, §§5A, 7A, II. 
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upgrading of width and depth requirements. The older provlSlon 
quite obviously intended, perhaps for constitutional reasons, to provide 
an escape valve for the hardship case. The amendment converts this 
to an absolute right, albeit limited in duration to five years. 
Two other changes were made in this section, probably aimed at 
clarification. One amendment disclaims all intent to prohibit any 
building permitted by a zoning ordinance or by-law.2 In Massachu-
setts, as in many other states, the vesting of any rights against a change 
of applicable zoning law occurs relatively late. Neither the issuance of 
a building permit nor the expenditure of substantial sums on such 
preliminary steps as grading suffices. Many localities nevertheless 
give as of grace what they could not be required to give as of course by 
excepting from the applicability of an upzoning ordinance develop-
ments that have proceeded to some specified stage. The present amend-
ment aims at dispelling any doubt as to the efficacy of such a locally 
granted exception. 
The other attempt at clarification focuses on the applicability of 
Section 8lT procedure.3 That section prescribes the route to be 
followed in obtaining planning commission approval of a subdivision 
plot in any instance where such approval is required by the statute. 
The act also provides that approval is not required under certain 
conditions, and when that is the case the planning commission is 
required to endorse the plat to that effect. The act failed to say how 
the subdivider was to go about obtaining such endorsement. This 
amendment fills the void, making Section 8lT procedure expressly 
applicable to the submission of plans for endorsement. 
Despite these efforts at clarification, at least one unnecessary am-
biguity in the subdivision control law still remains. It arises out of the 
language as to time of ownership of adjoining lots, which has been left 
unchanged. Literally interpreted it withholds statutory hardship 
relief only when the owner of the substandard lot owned an adjoining 
lot at the time of the upgrading. Thus construed, the section would 
be available to the person who, after his lot became substandard, 
purchased an adjoining lot but resold it before applying for a permit 
to build. 
§12.3. Zoning. The legislature also amended Section 7 A of the 
Zoning Enabling Act to parallel Section 5A.1 Thus the three-year 
period of grace commencing with the date of approval of a definitive 
subdivision plan limited on zoning changes is now five years. 
It reflects a legislative mood that the virtues of flexibility in zoning 
and subdivision administration have far too often been misguided into 
arbitrary or dilatory channels. Whether the best corrective is the 
setting of a rigid period and whether the particular period of five years 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 789. 
3 Acts of 1961, c. 332. The amendment is to G.L., c. 41, §81P, requiring the use 
of the procedure set out in G.L., c. 41, §81T. 
§12.3. 1 Acts of 1961, c. 435, amending G.L., c. 40A, §7A. 
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is not inordinately long are questions that will almost inevitably bring 
the section into the legislative mill for reconsideration. 
The same legislative mood is reflected less controversially in Chapter 
276 of the Acts of 1961. The act prohibits any member or associate 
member of the board that hears appeals in zoning matters and any 
member of the planning board from representing a party in interest 
before their respective boards. A general rule such as this section lays 
down leaves open many of the nicer questions. For example, may a 
partner of a member appear? In that situation, would it make a 
difference whether the member partner sits on the matter or dis-
qualifies himself? These are only a small sample of the questions that 
may arise, as to which the statute will provide at best only a starting 
point. It remains to be seen what answers the Supreme Judicial Court 
will extrapolate from the somewhat narrowly stated statutory guide. 
§12.4. Private agreements. Simultaneously with this enlargement 
of private rights vis-a-vis public planning officers, the legislature in 
eight new sections added to Chapters 184 and 184A of the General 
Laws acted on other private rights, modifying and intending, it has 
been suggested, to narrow the power of individuals to engage in land 
planning through conditions and restrictive covenants.1 Succeeding 
generations are often critical of the fetters forged by their ancestors 
curtailing their freedom to deal with land. This amendment has been 
viewed as an attempt to meet that criticism, and that may have been 
the purpose of the legislature. The result, however, may well be 
simply to codify, rather than lessen the hold of the past on the present. 
The provisions are such that an able and experienced conveyancer will 
probably be able to achieve the same objectives within the framework 
of the statute as before its enactment. In fact the net result may be 
that he not only achieves the same objective, but does so with a degree 
of certainty not possible under a purely case law regulation - which 
may prove a virtue where such private restriction serves a public 
purpose. 
The statutory scheme divides restrictions into two categories: (1) 
those imposed as part of a common scheme, i.e., private planning, and 
(2) others. The legal life of any restriction agreed upon after Decem-
ber 31, 1961, is limited to thirty years. This period may be extended 
if the restriction is part of a common scheme, as defined in the act, 
and if certain other conditions are satisfied. The conditions for 
extension are that it must have been provided for in the original 
agreement; it must be recorded before the expiration of the next 
preceding period; and 50 percent of the owners in the area must agree 
to the restriction at the time of its extension. Given these necessary 
circumstances, the restriction may survive to eternity by virtue of suc-
cessive twenty-year leases-on-life. While recordation of the original 
restricted agreement is not expressly required, it would seem to be 
§12.4. 1 Acts of 1961, c. 448, adding §§26-llO to c. 184 and §§lOA-lOC to c. 184A. 
See further comment on this act in §1.2 supra. 
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implicit in the statutory provision making the imposition "of record" 
integral to the definition of a common scheme restriction. 
Agreements antedating January 1, 1962, are all treated alike. 
Restrictive agreements not part of a common scheme, e.g., one between 
two individuals restricting the use of one parcel in favor of the other, 
as well as those that are, may be extended for successive twenty-year 
periods tacked on to the original statutory period - the later of fifty 
years or January 1, 1964 - by following a prescribed statutory 
procedure. 
The principal effect of the act will be to clear thousands of titles of 
defects owing to restrictions that are obsolete in fact, but not suffi-
ciently so to enable titles to be passed. By 1964 a fifty-year search can 
be relied upon, and by 1984 a thirty-year search will suffice. The life 
of the statute will probably be in the provisions denying enforcement 
unless the claimant would benefit actually and substantially by reason 
of it. The statute goes on to define negatively the legal meaning of 
"benefit," including, interestingly enough, changes in applicable public 
controls of land use. The provision, while an innovation to Massa-
chusetts statute law, is not startling. The underlying concept dates 
back several centuries to a time when common law countries, embark-
ing into an age of commerce and industry, sought to make land freely 
alienable. More recently, courts of equity in many jurisdictions in 
this country have refused to enforce specifically restrictive agreements 
that had outlived the conditions under which they were appropriate. 
The long-run effect of this act may be to facilitate a more rational 
land use pattern. Its more immediate effect is to create an ambiguity 
as to one class of cases - the situation of urban renewal and redevelop-
ment contracts, in which covenants are required by statute. What, for 
example, is the status of a covenant in a contract under which one 
developer acts as middleman between the local government and the 
ultimate land users? The developer acquires a large tract, renews or 
redevelops it, and then resells pieces of it to individuals. The com-
munity's ethics may differ from those of a particular component group, 
and since public funds are being used, the community may not 
unreasonably feel it should be given assurance that its ethical standard, 
incorporated in covenants, will endure for some period of time. One 
developer, however, is not a common scheme, even if the developed 
property is subsequently divided and conveyed to separate ownership. 
Government authorities, like private conveyancers, can doubtless 
learn to live with the new law. The authority can impose and enforce 
standards, even though not part of a common scheme, and continue 
them by filing. But urban renewal and redevelopment forms and 
proposed agreements should certainly be reviewed in the light of this 
new addition to Chapter 184. 
§12.5. Urban renewal. Urban renewal is more directly affected by 
two of the most ambitious of the current legislative product. One 
amends Chapter 121A, which governs urban redevelopment corpora-
4
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executive officer of the authority, until the planning commission was 
absorbed by it. Following the merger, he was making more money for 
discharging fewer duties. His grievance was that instead of heading 
the enlarged organization he headed one of several equal divisions or 
departments, all of which were under the newly appointed Develop-
ment Administrator. 
Only in the long run will it be known whether the loss of separate 
identity will carry with it the anticipated detriment to city planning 
that underlies it. Evaluation of the provision must also be in light 
of the turnpike authority's past record, and the indication of the 
deterioration of public confidence afforded by the twice-repeated fail-
ure of its recent bond issue. These events suggest that the better 
part of wisdom might have been to reverse the positions of the two 
authorities, giving the Boston Redevelopment Authority veto power 
over the inconsistent proposals of the Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the old city planning 
board and its functions are now incorporated into the redevelopment 
authority. 
A novel provision of the redevelopment act directs that, before 
approving any project which would require the destruction of resi-
dential property, the authority is to ascertain the availability of 
substitute habitation. Disapproval of the project is mandatory unless 
the authority finds that there are dwellings available, dwellings which 
are not only safe and sanitary, but within the financial means of the 
prospective tenant, reasonably convenient to his place of employment, 
and as desirable as the old quarters in such respect as access to public 
utilities and public and commercial facilities. Properly administered, 
this provision could do much to ameliorate the bitterness and ill will 
toward urban renewal generated by the hardship sometimes imposed 
in the past on those unhoused by renewal or redevelopment activity. 
At the same time, the legislature has taken a constructive step 
toward assuring the availability of such housing. Chapter 573 of the 
Acts of 1961 amends Section 26VV of G.L., c. 121, to increase the 
maximum Commonwealth guarantee for projects to provide low-cost 
housing for the elderly to $2,625,000 in any year and a total of $105 
million. After such housing has been completed, it becomes eligible 
for an additional subsidy of Ii percent of completion cost if the extra 
subsidy is necessary to meet the cost of operation and debt servicing. 
The total of such extra subsidies is limited to $1,575,000 in anyone 
year. This amount is in addition to the maximum annual basic 
subsidy of $2,625,000, but, it would seem, subject to the same over-all 
maximum of $105 million. 
Two other acts touch redevelopment. One permits the housing and 
redevelopment authorities to acquire land which has been determined 
to meet the statutory jurisdictional definition in advance of the adop-
tion and approval of a land assembly and redevelopment or renewal 
plan.6 The other gives the city of Boston carte blanche with respect 
6 Acts of 1961, c. 188, amending C.L .• c. 41, §§26P, 26Q. 
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to conveyances of land to the Boston Redevelopment Authority.7 
There need be neither public auction nor consideration. 
§12.6. Transportation. The urgency of problems in urban trans-
portation is reflected in the number of acts of the 1961 legislative 
session dealing with various aspects of the subject. One of them, 
Chapter 590 of the Acts of 1961, promises some amelioration of a 
particularly vexing, because needless, situation - the result of in-
adequate communication and cooperation of various levels of govern-
ment whose actions necessarily interact. Thus highway construction 
today is largely the province of federal and state governments, but 
has a great impact on the nontransportation land uses of munici-
palities. The difficulty arises because although this activity is un-
questionably carried on in accordance with a plan, it is not necessarily 
the plan approved by the local governments of the municipality 
affected. The judiciary, not unexpectedly, has refused to protect 
municipal land use plans from violation by federal or state govern-
ments. The only hope of solution, therefore, is through voluntary 
action, such as Chapter 590. Section 2 of the act directs the Depart-
ment of Public Works to expend a specified minimum sum out of the 
amount appropriated in Section 1 in each of four named areas. The 
significant section, with respect to intergovernmental cooperation, 
is Section 4. It requires that any public works project within the 
towns of Brookline and Saugus and the cities of Boston, Cambridge, 
Lynn, Peabody, Revere, Somerville, or Springfield be approved and 
accepted by the local government of the municipality affected before 
any of the authorized sum may be legally expended on it. 
The same spirit of cooperation and greater sophistication about the 
interaction of land uses animates an amendment to Section 10 of 
Chapter 16 of the General Laws, relating to the study and planning 
functions of the Mass Transportation Commission.1 Before the 
present amendment, the commission's assignment referred exclusively 
to mass transportation. This is now broadened, horizontally, to take 
in land use and urban renewal and development, and vertically, to 
take in federal activity and to require that it cooperate with federal 
agencies. 
Chapter 540 of the Acts of 1961 creates another new agency. This 
one is assigned the duty of managing the affairs of the Western 
Suburbs Transportation District, created by the same chapter. Like 
members of the Mass Transportation Commission and of planning 
boards generally, the members are to serve without pay; unlike those 
boards, this one not merely plans or regulates, but operates. Under 
the act, the board may contract with private corporations to provide the 
service or may itself do so. It is to be self-sustaining. It is required to 
keep accounts, to submit to an audit, and to render an annual report. 
Beyond this, however, the board is unregulated, even as to such an 
important item as rate fixing. 
7 Acts of 1961, c. 314, amending Acts of 1943, c.434, §4. 
§12.6. 1 Acts of 1960, c. 644. 
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The last of the important enactments relative to transportation 
limits the permissible height of structures within a specific distance 
of an airport runway or landing strip, with certain exceptions.2 In 
purporting to act under the police power, the legislature impliedly 
rejects any necessity to use its power of eminent domain to accomplish 
its end, a view held in other jurisdictions. In New Jersey, for example, 
the legislature had enacted a bill similarly invoking police powers to 
curtail rights in property near airports in the interest of air safety.s 
The New Jersey courts ruled that the purported regulation constituted 
a "taking" within the meaning of the constitution, and was therefore 
invalid.4 The case was not carried higher, and the legislature, ap-
parently acquiescing in the decision, has not adopted new legislation 
open to the same objection. 
The better view would seem to be that of New Jersey. Considera-
tions of air travel safety should certainly be paramount. Perhaps 
without the intervention of government action this could not be 
attained, or could be attained only at a prohibitive cost. If so, the 
use of eminent domain would be justified. But there is no reason 
why the cost of eliminating a hazard to air travel should be shifted 
on to some persons, simply because they happen to own land in the 
neighborhood. 
B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
§12.7. Eminent domain: Damages. The question of damages, 
which occupied the legislature in only one act, and there obliquely, 
loomed large municipally in the court decisions reviewed herein. 
With the possible exception of Bennett v. Brookline Redevelopment 
Authority,1 their substance is not particularly remarkable. 
Brookline Redevelopment came before the Court on an exception 
by the authority to the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of 
assessed valuation of the condemned property. The authority relied 
on a statute changing the common law rule excluding such evidence 
as to the value of takings by the state, or any county, city, town, or 
district.2 The issue was whether the section was applicable to a taking 
by a redevelopment authority. After following a tortuous path 
through the statutory maze, the Supreme Judicial Court, quite cor-
rectly it would seem, found that it did. 
The very serious need for some measure of value forged away from 
the heat of litigation is discernible in another of this group of cases. 
This case, Aselbekian v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority} was 
begun by a petition to assess damages caused by takings of the 
authority. The petitioners were awarded $110,000. Both sides offered 
2 Id .• c. 756. adding new §§35A-35D to G.L .• c. 90. 
S N.], Rev. Stat. §40:55-32. 
4 Yara Engineering Co. v. City of Newark. 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945). 
§12.7. 1342 Mass. 418.173 N.E.2d 815 (1961). 
2 G.L.. c. 79. §35. 
3341 Mass. 398, 169 N.E.2d 863 (1960). 
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expert testimony in proof of value. One of the petitioner's experts 
testified that damage to the petitioner was $179,200; one of the author· 
ity's experts testified that total damage came to $19,700. 
These facts were stated without editorial comment by a Court 
perhaps inured to such divergences between the opinions of experts. 
The commonness of the phenomenon, however, does not alter the fact 
that its effect is to leave the jury, and probably even the more so-
phisticated judges, without any sound basis for fixing awards. The 
Brookline Redevelopment Authority decision will be very salutary 
if it succeeds in making available objective evidence which, in addi-
tion to bearing directly on value, would furnish some clue as to the 
credibility of other evidence furnished by experts.4 
§12.8. Zoning: Nonconforming uses. The largest single category of 
land use cases, however, was not damage cases in connection with 
eminent domain takings, but zoning cases. Of these, three dealt 
with nonconforming uses. In all, the Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed the action reviewed which would have had the effect of extend-
ing or perpetuating a nonconforming use. In Hinves v. Commissioner 
of Public Works,1 the petitioner objected to a catering service, carried 
on next door to her by the intervener, in a single-residence district. 
Before the intervener had purchased the property some three years 
earlier, the premises had been used as a grocery store. This suit was 
begun after the respondent had refused to proceed because the in-
tervener's operations were, he said, a natural evolution of the non-
conforming grocery store use and, therefore, a continuing permitted 
use. The Court held that naturalness of evolution from a business 
standpoint was not determinative and that for zoning purposes the two 
types of businesses were in different categories. 
§12.9. Zoning: Variances and nonconforming uses. The other two 
cases deal with nonconforming uses only indirectly. Both involved 
attempts to obtain variances from the zoning ordinance, with a prior 
nonconforming use figuring in the background to shore up the grant. 
In Shacka v. Board of Appeals of Chelm~ford,1 the variance was granted 
to a gas station operator in a general residence district. The antipathy 
of the Supreme Judicial Court to variances may perhaps be gauged by 
its reversal of the Superior Court's upholding of the grant, in the 
face of findings, not rejected, that the applicant had been forced to 
vacate his former site by a taking for highway purposes, that there 
4 The two other eminent domain cases were McCarthy v. Woburn Housing Author-
ity, 341 Mass. 539, 170 N.E.2d 700 (1960), and DiPerrio v. Town of Holden, !l41 
Mass. 342, 169 N.E.2d 903 (1960). The McCarthy case holds that a property owner 
dissatisfied with security furnished for payment of any subsequent award for taking 
must follow the statutory procedure of petitioning for an increase. G.L., c. 79, §40; 
c. 121, §26P(b). The DiPerrio case holds that a petitioner is entitled to be told the 
court's decision as to each of his requests for rulings, however obvious the rule 
referred to and however correct the final result. 
§12.8. 1342 Mass. 54,172 N.E.2d 232 (1961). 
§12.9. 1!l41 Mass. 593, 171 N .E.2d 167 (1961). 
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was a need for the use in the area of the proposed site, and that the 
area along the subject street had become markedly commercial. 
DiRico v. Board of Appeals of Quincy2 differed in that the variance 
was sought for the site then used in a nonconforming manner. The 
existing structure had been used as a tonic bottling factory before the 
advent of zoning and the classification of the area as residential. 
Various business enterprises continued the nonconforming use. In 
1954 the building was vacated and had become dilapidated. The 
owner sought and was granted a variance to remodel the building 
for use as a professional office building. The lower court entered a 
decree that the board did not exceed its authority in granting the 
variance. This was reversed. In many jurisdictions the desired use, 
being "higher" than the existing one, could have been permitted 
under the legal shelter of the nonconforming factory use. Thus, here, 
too, was the hard case, evidencing once again the tendency of the 
Supreme Judicial Court to hew fast to the requirement that substantial 
and special hardship must be shown to support the granting of a 
variance. 
§12.10. Zoning: Rezoning. The Supreme Judicial Court appeared 
much more kindly disposed to the zoning ordinance amendment 
brought before it for review in Elmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment 
of Boston.1 It was upheld against several strong arguments. The 
amendment increased the density of the zone which - before and after 
the amendment - was designed for multiple residential use. The 
plaintiffs urged invalidity on several grounds: (1) the amendment was. 
deliberated and voted in executive session, contrary to the statute 
requiring such matters be dealt with in open meetings; (2) it purported 
to create a new combination of bulk and use of district which was 
beyond the power of the board; and (3) the amendment constituted 
spot zoning. The first two arguments were rejected on the strength 
of the legislative intent inferred by the Court from related sections, 
and, in the case of the second, from legislative actions and inaction 
in the face of similar administrative creations in the past. In rejecting 
the spot zoning charge the Court reaffirmed the board's discretion to 
determine the boundary of the newly created area provided only there 
was evidence, not necessarily relied on by the board, distinguishing the 
rezoned area from that not so rezoned.2 
In Doliner v. Town Clerk of Millis3 the Supreme Judicial Court 
2341 Mass. 607,171 N.E.2d 144 (1961). 
§12.10. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1063, 176 N.E.2d 16. 
2 Rice v. Board of Appeals of Dennis, 342 Mass. 499, 174 N.E.2d 355 (1961), 
presented only procedural questions. Building Inspector of Chelmsford v. Belle· 
ville, 342 Mass. 216, 172 N.E.2d 695 (1961), was an attack upon the validity of a 
zoning ordinance on the ground that it specified the permitted uses without pro· 
hibiting all others. The argument seems either specious or silly, and even the 
short discussion the Court gave it appears to have been more than it warranted. 
31961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1049, 175 N.E.2d 925. See further comment on this case in 
§18.32 infra. 
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again upheld a rezoning. To reach this result, the Court rejected ex 
necessitato the plaintiff's contentions that a second public hearing 
should have been had before the amendment was put to a vote because 
of changes made after the first hearing; that the classification provided 
was arbitrary and unreasonable; and, last, that it unconstitutionally 
prohibited religious and educational structures in industrial zones. 
On the same day the Court handed down its decision in another 
case between essentially the same parties,4 but one arising under the 
Subdivision Control Law, which gives the background of the litigation. 
The plaintiff, a landowner in the area to be rezoned, in order to avoid 
the impending change, filed a subdivision plan after favorable vote 
on the amendment but before the formalities necessary to make it law 
were taken. The plaintiff had prevailed below on the theory that his 
plan was not subject to the by-law, which was not yet perfected law 
at the time; that the purported disapproval of the planning board 
was a nullity because no public hearing had been held; and that 
retention for sixty days without action was tantamount to approval 
under the statute. 
The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that a building permit 
issued during the pendency of action on a zoning by-law to which 
it did not conform would not be valid if the by-law were subsequently 
enacted. From this it deduced that there could not have been any 
legislative intent to require the planning board to disregard by-law 
proposals further along the path to becoming law. 
§12.11. Board of health: Licensing trailer parks. In the course of 
its opinion in the first Doliner case the Court pointed out that to 
come to a conclusion it had had to reconcile "different statutes, enacted 
and amended at different times." This statement, although not there 
made, was equally appropriate to Cliff v. Board of Health of Ames-
bury'! The case involved a trailer park, a frequent target of zoning 
ordinances, but here the target of the local board of health purporting 
to act pursuant to a delegation of police power by the state. When 
the trailer park, which was to consist of permanent rather than 
transient units, was first proposed, the board was not, judging from 
the reaction of the board member with whom the plaintiff discussed it, 
opposed to the project. That the board's attitude had changed even 
before the hearing held on the plaintiff's application may be con-
jectured from its promulgation of a new regulation, requiring a permit 
to live in a trailer camp for more than ninety days in any six-month 
period. The possibility of a water shortage, raised at the hearing, took 
on the dimensions of a probability in light of a still later study made 
by a public works department engineer. This alleged shortage was 
cited as the chief, although not sole, reason for the denial of the 
plaintiff's application, which followed shortly thereafter. 
There is certainly authority for the view that the board acted 
4 DoHner v. Planning Board of Millis, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 10!9, 175 N.E.2d 919. 
§12.11. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. llOI, 175 N.E.2d 489. 
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unfairly in changing its rules while the plaintiff's application was 
pending and with it in view. There is, however, authority for the 
contrary view as well. Persuasive arguments can likewise be mar-
shaled on both sides. More difficult to refute is the argument that 
the board's action was inconsistent with Daley Construction Co. v. 
Planning Board of Randolph.2 The facts of the two cases are similar 
in that in Daley approval necessary for execution of the contemplated 
project was also withheld on the ground that it would aggravate an 
already existing water shortage. They differed in that in the Daley 
case the approving agency was the planning board, the project was a 
conventional residential development, and the controlling law was 
Chapter 41 of the General Laws, Sections 8lK to 81GG, particularly 
Section 81M, upon which the board relied. Section 81M provides, 
inter alia, that the board should exercise its powers "with due regard 
for . . . securing adequate provision for water . . ." and, by a sub-
sequent amendment, should approve any plan which conformed 
to the "recommendations of the board of health" and the planning 
board's own reasonable rules and regulations. 
The comparison is somewhat complicated by the fact that Daley, 
unlike Cliff, obtained the approval of the local board of health, which 
apparently saw no reason for perturbation in the joint determination 
of the water commissions of its town and two neighboring towns that 
"there was an acute shortage of water and lack of water pressure ... 
and that a fire hazard had been created." 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Daley construed the language of 
Section 81M quoted above to refer to a system of water pipes rather 
than to the supply of water that would be available. It was obviously 
influenced strongly by the legislative intent, indicated in the history 
of the act, to prevent arbitrary administrative action "[in]consistent 
with our ideal of constitutional government." But action arbitrary 
when taken by a planning board is not less arbitrary by reason of 
being taken by a board of health, when the two actions are taken for 
the same reason and the reason in both cases has the same factual 
foundation. 
It may be argued that, notwithstanding differences in the tenor of 
the opinions, they are perfectly consistent because of differences in the 
respective governing statutes. But even if so, it would absolve 
the courts but lay open the legislature to the charge of denying even-
handed justice. This charge is not proved simply by the conflicting 
results in the two cases. Rationalizations of that difference may be 
possible. For example, living quarters may be needed, and conditions, 
such as a water shortage, may make impossible the provision of a 
supply sufficiently large to afford a choice to the individual. In such 
case, if the community is to make the choice, it should opt in favor of 
all conventional homes if trailer residences would be detrimental to 
the welfare of the community and of the individuals who would be 
2340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.7. 
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dwelling in the new accommodations of one kind or the other, while 
the detriments to the would-be developer of the trailer park are minor. 
But unless there are some substantial and objective bases,s there is no 
reason to differentiate, which in fact can be done under the existing 
law, as construed by the Court. 
§12.12. Zoning: Comprehensive plan. Trailers were again the 
b~te noire in Town of Granby v. Landry,t which unfortunately adds 
another footnote to the cliche of the law that hard cases make bad law. 
This is not the classic case: the "hard" aspect is associated with the 
defendant, not the plaintiff, and it evokes not sympathy but antipathy. 
But like the classic case, the response seems emotional rather than 
intellectual, and as is so often true of such responses, sets a bad 
precedent for the future. The ordinance upheld by the Supreme 
Judicial Court prohibited the keeping of more than one house trailer 
on a parcel of land and the use of any trailer for living quarters 
outside of a licensed trailer camp. This was the entire scope of the 
zoning by-law; no zoning plan had been adopted by the community, 
and there was no division of the town into zones. 
The decision emphasizes the omission in the Massachusetts enabling 
law of the usual requirement of a comprehensive plan. That require-
ment was a response to early zoning practices that were widely felt to 
result in unfair and unequal impact of the then infant law of zoning. 
It, however, gave rise to new difficulties of construction which, doubt-
less, the Massachusetts legislature sought to avoid by not using the 
phrase. It would be extraordinary if the legislature intended thereby 
to invite or sanction zoning such as the present by-law, which represents 
the very antithesis of "comprehensive" zoning, however defined. It 
may be that trailers as permanent habitation pose special problems 
that warrant singling them out for special treatment, regulating the 
conditions of their use. If, however, it is desired to do more than 
assure the safe and sanitary condition of house trailers and to exclude 
them entirely (except for the quite different trailer camp use) from 
the list of permissible land uses, then it should be done in the context 
of a general zoning scheme, subject to the usual protections of review 
for reasonableness of classification, and so forth. 
§12.13. Subdivision control: Default on failure to provide improve-
ments. The subdivision control law which entered tangentially in the 
Doliner1 and ClifJ2 cases was more directly involved in Town of 
S The writers find it difficult to think of a concrete hypothetical. Generally, it 
would seem that if trailer residences are harmful they should not be permitted, and 
if they are not harmful there is no reason to eliminate them from the choices avail-
able to the individual because of water shortage. 
§12.12. 1341 Mass. 443, 170N.E.2d 364 (1960). 
§12.13. 1 Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039, 175 
N.E.2d 919, noted in §14.10 supra. 
2 Cliff v. Board of Health of Amesbury, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1101, 175 N.E.2d 489, 
noted in §14.11 supra. 
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Stoneham v. Savelo3 and Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc.,4 which 
expose some of its more obscure and perplexing aspects. Both actions 
were brought on performance bonds furnished by developers in order 
to obtain subdivision plot approval. The controversy in Savelo was 
as to the extent of his obligation to improve that part of a private way 
which lay between his property and a public way, a distance of some 
339 feet. Savelo denied the town's contentions that he had made any 
undertaking with regard to it; he also contended that if he had it 
would be illegal and unenforceable. As a matter of contract law, his 
argument, based on the fact that he had no right to enter onto the land 
in question, was doomed to failure ever since Gaston v. Gordon5 
endorsed in 1911 the proposition laid down some 210 years earlier in 
Paradine v. Jane6 that subjective "impossibility" does not excuse non-
performance of contractual duties. 
The more interesting question relating to land use law was ap-
parently not explored by the parties. Could the planning commission 
have demanded that Savelo make the same improvements as a condi-
tion of approving his plot? An affirmative answer would seem to 
follow from the Supreme Judicial Court's reading of the statute. This 
is certainly a reasonable interpretation of the language and, it may 
be urged, also a correct legislative choice, since it is not unreasonable 
to require a subdivider to link his development to the outside world, 
whatever the cost. The counterargument is that this solution either 
consigns one's property to indefinite idleness or gives the owner of the 
adjacent land a windfall at his neighbor's expense. Even if a con-
stitutionally permissible choice, alternative solutions might achieve 
a fairer balancing of public and private interests. 
In Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc.,7 the developer again defaulted 
on his obligation to provide improvements. This time it was one of 
his purchasers in the subdivision, rather than the municipality, who 
brought action on the performance bond. The result, sustaining a 
demurrer against the complaint, seems correct. Permitting each 
individual to recover his proportionate share of damage would tend to 
frustrate the purposes of the subdivision control law. But it is difficult 
to see why the Supreme Judicial Court thought it necessary to deduce 
from the statutory declaration of purpose in Section 8lM8 that the 
subdivision control law "is thus designed primarily to benefit the 
inhabitants of cities and towns generally and those who purchase lots 
in developments only secondarily," in order to support its result. The 
class to be benefited may be important in some contexts, but on 
the facts of the Gordon case not that, but the benefit to be conferred, 
is the crux of the matter. That benefit was improved roads and 
3341 Mass. 456,170 N.E.2d 417 (1960). 
4342 Mass. 529,174 N.E.2d 381 (1961). 
5208 Mass. 265, 94 N.E. 307 (1911). 
6 Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1646). 
7342 Mass. 529,174 N.E.2d 381 (1961). 
8 C.L., c. 41, §8IM. 
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utilities, not a money equivalent of their worth. Permitting individual 
recovery would mean those amenities could be had by the voluntary 
cooperative action of the individual lot owners, which is highly un-
likely, or through municipal action, whose cost would then be specially 
assessed against the benefited property owners, which was the very 
system found wanting and superseded. 
§12.14. Redevelopment authorities: Tenure of employees. The 
land use case decided during the 1961 SURVEY year which may have the 
furthest-reaching consequences is Simonian v. Boston Redevelopment 
Authority.1 It holds that the tenure statute does not entitle the 
plaintiff to be restored to his position as it existed before the merger 
of the Government agency he headed with another. Under the Mas-
sachusetts tenure statute, the plaintiff could not be deprived of rank, 
compensation, or office except for just cause, proved in hearings held 
pursuant to notice and subject to judicial review.2 The Supreme 
Judicial Court concedes, arguendo at any rate, that the plaintiff's rights 
under the tenure statute were violated unless just cause existed. It 
then concludes that just cause existed in the enlarged scope of the 
authority's jurisdiction after the merger and dispenses with the issue 
of procedural protections as having been enjoyed in substance if not 
form in the proceeding at bar. Quite obviously and openly, however, 
the Court is more influenced to its conclusion by the strong conviction 
that the protection of tenure statutes is more appropriate for the rank-
and-file civil servant than the high-ranking policy-making executive. 
The natural result, for better or worse, will be to strengthen the 
influence of the legislature over boards, agencies, and commissions or, 
stated conversely, to lessen their independence. The corollary of this 
is the reintroduction of the political element that "independence" 
was intended to exclude. The legislature, with an able assist from 
the Court, has thus proved that, however difficult, it is not impossible 
to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. 
§12.15. Evaluation. From a planning perspective the legislative 
activity during the 1961 SURVEY year has been more significant than 
the judicial. But whether the net effect of the legislation furthers or 
impedes planning is a close question. On the plus side, the way has 
been cleared for greater renewal and redevelopment activity than may 
have been possible under the old slum-blight jurisdiction. The im-
portance of plans and planners in the increasingly important renewal 
and redevelopment picture has been enlarged - outside of Boston. 
On the other hand the future may show that it suffered a serious set-
back in Boston by reason of planning activities having been merged 
with an operating department. Again on the minus side, another ad 
hoc regional commission has been added to the roster with no clue 
as to how it is to relate, if at all, to a planning commission or master 
plan for the area, if or when those should exist. Vested rights are 
§12.14. 1 M2 Mass. 573, 174 N.E.2d 429 (1961). noted in another connection in 
§12.5 supra. The case is also commented on in §18.6 infra. 
2 G.L.. c. 121. §26QQ, as amended by Acts of 1958, c. 299. 
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created which will have a natural tendency to become a drag on the 
ability of the law to keep up with changing standards. Straddling 
the divide, the legislature has limited the enforceability of private 
restrictive agreements, removing pro tanto potential obstacles to im-
plementation of a comprehensive plan for the area. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the cases is the implication by 
Justice Cutter in Doliner, substantiated by the statement of facts 
in cases such as Cliff, that the general laws relating to land use are in 
need of review. Temporary inconsistencies and even conflicts are not 
surprising in the law. All problems cannot be anticipated in advance; 
situations change. These and other reasons make amendments from 
time to time inevitable. When there are piecemeal additions to a 
complex body of law, inconsistencies and conflicts somehow steal in. 
Periodically, however, they should also be swept out, and the time 
would seem ripe for the job. It may be that the time is also ripe 
for the courts to make an analogous review, and to reconsider particu-
larly whether the scope of judicial review given the grant or denial 
of a variance is not broader than that given an amendment, and 
whether there is a basis for any difference. Both a variance and an 
amendment may be the product of administrative, rather than legisla-
tive, action, and today - much more than in the past - both may 
directly affect the property of only a single owner. 
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